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The purpose of this paper is to define euthanas,ia, give a brief 
outline of the history of the idea and practice, recognize some of the 
reasons it has become a current topic for controversy, and acquaint the 
reader with the multiplicity of factors that emerge in discussions on 
euthanasia. Perspectives from the medical, psychological, legal and 
moral realms will be advanced in the text. In the conclusion, each 
of these perspectives will be evaluated as to the validity of its .~ 
assertions and its place within the framework on which to base deci-
sions concerning euthanasia. 
A STUDY OF EUTHANASIA 
Introduction 
There seems to be much confusion regarding the issue of euthana-
sia. This confusion probably is the result of a variety of reasons, 
one being that a precise definition is often not made at the beginning 
of the debate and, therefore, not everyone involved is discussing the 
same issue. It is also very difficult to construct the complete pic-
ture regarding euthanasia due to the fact that it can be viewed on so 
many different levels and requires the attention of so many different 
communities--doctors, nurses, theologians, ethicists and philosophers, 
to name a few. A third contributing factor that can account for this 
confusion is that euthanasia lends itself well to emotion-packed ap-
peals. Opponents of euthanasia claim that those who favor it wish to 
play God and obtain a license to murder, while the accused';. in turn, 
claim that their accusers go to great lengths to strip man of his last 
vestiges of dignity during his dying days. 
1 
Even when these causes for confusion can be eliminated, a neat so-
lution to the problem of euthanasia is not insured. However, the issue 
will receive clarification and allow those involved in decisions con-
cerning the problem to think intelligently on the subject. It is in 
the hopes of doing this and providing a few guidelines within which to 
operate that I now turn to the definition of euthanasia. 
I. Definition 
Originally, euthanasia was defined and thought of as a happy 
death. Since death is inevitable, euthanasia, in the sense of being a 
happy demise, was looked upon with favor and was indeed hoped for. In 
current usage, though, the term euthanasia, commonly called mercy-
killing, seems to bring to the minds of most people an unfavorable im-
pression. It is most generally taken to mean the deliberate killing of 
persons for a wide variety of medical reasons. Webster's Seventh New 
Collegiate Dictionary defines euthanasia as 11 the act or practice of 
killing individuals (as persons or domestic animals) that are hopeless-
ly sick or inJjured for reasons of mercy. 11 This definition definately 
narrows the acope of the previous one in which the broader interpreta-
tion allowed issues such as abortion to be considered under the title 
euthanasia. In this paper Webster's definition (confined to persons) 
will be used as a starting point. 
It will be helpful here, however, to make a further distinction 
as to the definition. That is the distinction between active and 
passive euthanasia. Active euthanasia is a deliberate and direct act 
taken to terminate the life ef a hepelessly ill or injured person. 
2 
Passive euthanasia, on the other hand, is not taking the action needed 
~o keep a person alive and 1 ther.e~y, indirectly aausing death. Giving a 
fatal drug to a patient would be active euthanasia; while simply re-
fusing to keep a patient on a respirator would be considered passive 
euthanasia. 1 
Joseph Fletcher has coined a new term for the case of passive eu-
thanasia. He uses the term 11 anti-dysthanasia 11 meaning the indirect 
2 
ending of a hard or bad death. In the later case death is not in-
duced b~t only permitted. Since I see no special value in using this 
new term, the more common terms 11 active 11 and 11 passive 11 will be used in 
this paper to distinguish the means through which euthanasia are 
accomplished. 
II. History and Development of the Movement 
Many people have the misconceived notion that euthanasia is a 
new phenomena brought on solely by our tremendous technical advances, 
but this is not so. Euthanasia dates far back to primitive man and has 
remained an unresolved problem up to this day. 
Among certain primitive people, the killing or abandonment of 
aged or helpless members of tribes was a common and accepted practiceo 
The Hottentots, for example, were known to have carried their elderly 
parents out into the bush where they would be left to die. P. Caraman 
writes of the Lapps that when their old folk were unable to trek the 
For a case that concerns active and passive euthanasia see 
Appendix, Item 1, the case of Missy. A more complete · disco.ssitm'. Wirth 
reference to this case will be taken up below. 
2Joseph Fletcher, 11 Anti-Dysthanasia: The Problem of Prolonging 
Death," Journal of Pastoral Care, (1964):7?-84. 
mountains with their families, they were left behind unattended to die 
in their tents. The corpse froze and was buried upon the family's re-
turn. Another method they used was to strap their old people to a 
sleigh alive and shoot them down a snow-covered precipice into a fjord. 
Practices very similar to these have been reported used by many other 
primitive peoples including Eskimos. It is thought that the old and 
sick people in the societies whePe these practices were common began to 
accept their end and submitted to it uncomplainingly.J 
There are, however, some primitive societies which were known to 
have had elaborate social codes which actually protected the sen~or 
members of their tribes. Hospitality eastoms, property rights, and 
food taboos reserving certain choice dished for the aged and helpless 
were among some of the protections provided by these societies. 
Settled agricultural communities showed the highest level of solici-
tude for their elderly members, and this is well exemplified by the 
laws of the Hebrews in the Old Testament, forbidding the killing of 
the 'innocent and just,' and in their general attitude of respect for 
the old. 
One of the important historical developments which is mentioned 
in many discussions of euthanasia is the Hippocratic Oath. Many say 
the oath expressly forbids any form of euthanasia.4 Taken in its 
expressed terms, though, it also forbids abortion and many common 
practices of medicine today. However, most medical students today 
3 Jonathan Gould and Lord Craigrcyle, Your Death Warrant? (New 
Rochelle, New York: Arlington House, 1971), pp.20-29. 
4For the content of the Hippocratic Oath see Appendix, Item 2. 
4 
5 
take, not the original Hippocratic Oath, but a modified form which con-
tains more general terminology and much more latitude in interpretation. 5 
In short, people using the original Hippocratic Oath as a basis for 
argument against euthanasia will have to be prepared to defend the ac-
cepted and widespread practices the oath would also forbid, and those 
hiding in the protective ambiguity of the modified form have only their 
subjectivity to rely on. 
The situation in classical Greece and Rome concerning euthanasia 
is not too clear, though the general attitude of the people toward 
suicide indicates that euthanasia was accepted. Suicide was an ac-
cepted form of death, especially in Rome, and was thought of very 
often as the honorable way out. Seneca the Younger stood firmly behind 
this premise saying that 11 ••• just as a long drawn-out life does not 
necessarily mean .- a better one, so a long drawn-out death necessarily 
means a worse one. 116 This does not mean, however, that suicide did 
not have any opposition, f'for it did, notably Cicero. There seems to be 
no real evidence that there was any policy of elimination for the sick 
and elderly at this time, but infanticide was widely practiced and 
met the approval of both Aristotle and Plato. In Sparta, especially, 
any weak or deformed babies were left exposed to the elements to die. 
Another event in history that is used quite often in discussions 
on euthanasia, this time by supporters, is the writing of Utopia by 
Sir Thomas More (1478-1535), 11 the Catholic mercy-killer 11 • More 1s 
5For the content of the modified form of the Hippocratic Oath, 
see Appendix, Item 3. 
6Gould, Your Death Warrant?, p. 27. 
Utopians allowed euthanasia as follows: 
"As I have said, they treat the sick with great kindness 
and leave nothing undone to restore their health, whether 
it is by drugs or by dieting. If anyone is suffering from 
an incurable disease, they consele him by sitting with him, 
talking to him and supplying all the comforts they can. But 
if a disease is not merely beyond treatment, but also a 
constant source of pain and agony, the priests and magistrates 
remind him that he is not up to all the tasks of life, is 
troublesome to others and a burden to himself and is now 
outliving his own death. Then they advise him not to resolve 
to feed that pestilence and sickness any longer, nor to 
hesitate to die, since life is a torment to him. They bid 
him to take good hope and release himself from that bitter 
life, as if from a prison or torture rack, or at least give 
his permission for others to remove him. They tell him 
that since he is going to put an end not to pleasure but to 
punishment, he would be well advised to do it; and since 
in that matter he is going to take the advice of priests, the 
interpreters of God., his action will also be pious and holy. 
Those who are persuaded by this either end their own lives 
by abstinence from food, or ealse are released from it while 
they are asleep, without any sensation of death. But they 
never remove anyone against his will, nor are they any 
the less considerate to him. It is considered honorable to 
yield to persuasion and die like this. But they think a man 
unworthy of burial or cremation who commits suicide without 
having a reason approved of by the pr~ests and Senate. In-
stead~,7in great disgrace, he is flung unburied into some 
bog." · 
This was certainly an unusual stand for a Catholic to take. What 
those who use this argument fail to realize, though, is that what More 
was concerned with in his satire was to describe ar,non-Christian 
society and to show how in many ways it was to be preferred to the 
Renaci.ssancee:· societies of his own time. He himself wrote that he only 
explained and did not defend all the principles of the Utopian consti-
6 
tution. Therefore, since More's stand on euthanasia cannetnbe ,discerned, 
the use of Utopia in arguments for or against euthanasia is invalid. 
7sir Thomas More, Utopia. (New York, New York: Washington 
Square Press, 1965) p. 88. 
In 1873, L.A. Tollemache in an eloquent and persuasive article, 8 
made a strong plea for the legislation of voluntary euthanasia. The 
problem with his plea was that the cases he considered severe enough 
to merit euthanasia, were ones so severe that the patient could not 
give consent. Thus voluntary euthanasia was impossible. A British 
newspaper9 called this problem to his attention, and Tollemache at once 
issued an apologia statfumg that in cases where consent cannot be 
obtained, a dying person showld be allowed to die a natural death. 
This reversal did not, however, end the debate on euthanasia for 
on October 16, 1931, Dr. C. Killick Millard, Medical Officer of Health 
for the city of Leicester, in the Presidental Address to the Society of 
Medical Officers of Health presented a plea for the legislation of 
voluntary euthanasia. This was the birth of the euthanasia movement in 
Britain. He asserted that the majority of people who die do so in 
great pain and that increasing mortality from cancer would increase the 
proportion of painful deaths. He quoted at length from More's Utqpia. 
7 
In his speech Dr. Millard presented a long comparative study of the morals 
of suicide and euthanasia. He categorized suidide as an irrevocable 
step in which one can be so easily mistaken. He then stated that, 
111Legalised voluntary euthanasia would come into quite a different 
category, as an act which was rational, courageous, and often highly 
altruistic. 1 u10 
811The New Cure of Incurables," Fortnightly Review 19. (873):218. 
911Mr. Tollemache and the Right to Die, 11 The Spectator 46. (1873):206. 
10c. K. Millard, "Address to the Society of Medical Officers of 
Health," Public Health. (November, 1931):3.5. 
Dr. Millard introduced a draft bill entitled 11The Voluntary Eutha-
nasia (Legislation) Bill" and as a result of the support he received 
established the Euthanasia Society in 1935. Many distinguished people 
were soon numbered among its members and its avowed objectives were: 
••• to create a public opinion favorable to the view that an 
adult person suffering severely from a fatal illness for 
which no cure is known, should be entitled by law to the 
mercy of a painless death if and when ti!t is his expressed 
wish: and to promote ~. lb.mms ... ih§gmslatool'il.~ 
After the first reactions to Dr. Millard's draft bill were felt 
and after an ensuing debate, a second reading of the bill was refused 
b,y a vote of 35 to 14. 
Three years after the establishment of the Euthanasia Society in 
Britain a similar society was established in America by Rev. Charles 
Potter. At first the Euthanasia Society of America proposed compulsory 
euthanasia of monstrosities and imbeciles, but as a result of answers 
to a questionaire addressed to physicians in the State of New York in 
1941, decided to limit itself to voluntary euthanasia. In the last four 
years, the society has grown from 600 to over 50,000. They have been 
filling an unprecedanted number of requests for free copies of "A 
L. . w·ll u12 ~vmg ~ • 
Despite this growing interest in euthanasia, the movement was 
dealt a blow in 1950 when the General Assembly,:· of the World Medical 
Association approved a resolution recommending to all national associa-
tions that they 111 condemn the practice of euthanasia under any circum-
stances.1111J 
11Gould, Your Death Warrant? pp.25-26. 
8 
12The 11Living Will" is not legally binding but seems to be making an 
impression on medical staffs, since the will expresses the patient's 
wishes. For its content see Appendix, Item 4. 
13Gould, Your Death Warrant? P• 27. 
This did not crush the movement for in 1952 a number of British and 
American clergymen, doctors and scientists presented to the United 
Nations a petition for the amendment of the Declaration on Human Rights 
to provide for incurable sufferers the right of voluntary euthanasia. 
It bore 2513 signatures, but an amendment was not passed. 
Cur~ently there have been several proposals made to different 
state legislatures, and many figures such as Joseph Fletcher, Paul 
Ramsey and Daniel Maguire have become prominent in the euthanasia move-
ment. These recent developments will be taken up later, after some of 
the reasons for such a current interest in the movement are considered. 
III. The Urgency of Euthanasia 
Currently, there seems to be an 11urgency 11 concerning decisions 
made about euthanasia. This urgency has been attributed. to three main 
factors: (1) revolutionary developments in medical science, (2) the 
laggardly state of the law, and (3) important shifts in moral out-
look. 
These factors will be discussed in subsequent sections of this 
paper, but it will be helpful here to note the general population's 
outlook on death and its awareness of the subject of euthanasia. 
Daniel Maguire has said that, hopefully, a healthier attitude 
toward death will emerge in our culture. Previously British historian 
Arnold Toynbee has charged that, 11for Americans, death is un-American 
and an affront to every citizen's inalienable right to life, liberty, 
and the pursuit of happiness. 1114 Maguire agrees with him on this point. 
14
naniel c. Maguire, Death~ Choice. (Garden City, New York: 
Doubleday and Company, 1974) p. 1 • 
9 
Man is the only animal who knows he is going to die. Poets and 
philosophers have proclaimed the significance of death-consciousness, 
yet, it would seem the average person would rather forget it. This is 
especially true if the average person is an American, sine~ in this 
happiness-oriented land, death (outside of a military context) is seen 
as something of an un-American activity. 15There seems to be, however, 
a very recent change in outlook in our coun~ry. Harvard professor 
Edwin Schneidman goes so far as to dub this the age of de~th. 
"In the Western World, 11 he writes, 11we are more death-
oriented today than we have been since the days of the Black 
Plague in the 14th Century. There is a thanatology boom in ",'". 
colleges and in print and there are random reports from the 
lecture circuits tgat death is now outdrawing the perennials--
sex and politics. 
Despite this new outlook on death, 17 the topic of euthanasia as a 
whole is still subterranean, and decisions are being made predominant-
ly by thousands of doctors in millions of different situations and by 
undefined, particulariz·e,Q., ad hoc criteria. Bayless Manning, Stanford 
law school dean, believes that a partial solution to this would be a 
happily financed, well-managed, hard-working, yearly study meeting 
which would bring together doctors, lawyers, moralists of every stripe, 
insurance experts, nurses, social workers, morticians, sociologists, 
gravely ill persons, clergymen, journalists, etc., to discuss the 
current state of dying and publicize their results. 18 
15Daniel c. Maguire, "Freedom to Die, 11 New Theology no.10. (New 
York, New York: The Macmillian Company, 1973): 187. 
10 
16Edwin Schneidman, 11The Enemy, 11 Psycbol agy Tada;v. (August, 1970): 37. 
17This new outl~ok on death is a sign of gain and health and not of 
decadence and morbidity, because it is only in a mature culture that death 
can come of age and be received and accepted as a natural companion of life. 
18Maguire, Death nY Choice, P• 2. 
Perhaps if Mr. Manning's suggestion was followed, and a report re-
leased, the public would at least b~ more aware of the debate on eutha-
nasia and its urgency. Most of the polls taken that deal with eutha-
nasia in the past have shown that the majority of the people has not 
felt any real need as of yet to make a deQasion on this subject. How-
ever, the trend seems to be changing. A survey was conducted on the 
campus of Ouachita Baptist University in Arkadelphia, Arkansas which 
generally showed that some forms of voluntary euthanasia were favored, 
and only a very small percentage of those surveyed ruled it out en-
tirely or wanted it to be involuntary. 19 
Public approval of the idea has increased sharply since a 1950 
Gallup Poll, when 36 per cent of Americans said they approved of 
euthanasia. In a 1973 survey, 53 per cent expressed the view that 
physicians should be allowed by law to end the life of the incurably 
ill if the patient and family requested it. A national poll conducted 
by Life magazine in April, 1972 indicated' t~at 90 per c,ent of )the 4L,OOO 
readers who returned the questionnaire felt that a patient with a 
terminal illness should have the right to refuse treatment that would 
attifically prolong life. The Canadian Institute of Public Opinion 
published results of a Gallup Poll in October, 1972, which indicated 
that Canadian opinion over the years is swinging toward a permissive 
attitude about mercy killing. Some _?O _.year§ .;i.g6., 62 per cent of 
11 
19This survey was conducted by Michelle Wasson in 1974. The contents 
of the survey and the statistical breakdown can be seen in the Appendix, 
Items 5 and 6. 
Canadians were against euthanasia; today 52 per cent approve of a 
doctor taking the life of a hopelessly ill patient, at the patient's 
20 
request. 
IV· Differing Perspectives on the Controversy 
Medical perspectives 
The accepted aim of medical pvactice has long been to fight death, 
the enemy, with its complete power, and ease the suffering of the in-
curably ill as much as possible. Given the situation that faced early 
physicians it is no wonder the profession developed an ethic that 
placed a preponderant emphasis on preserving life at all costs. But as 
of now, medicine is not at all sure who the enemy is. 
Medicine, for the moment, suddenly finds itself bereft of an 
agreed-upon definition of death. Death is seen now not as a 11 moment 11 
but as a process and indeed a very changeable process. The traditional 
medical standard of death, accepted by the law, has been the definition 
of death in Black's Law Dictionary: 
The cessation of life; the ceasing to exist; defined by 
physicians as a total stoppage of the circulation of the 
blood and a cessation of the animal and vital functions 
consequent+. thereon, such as respiration, pulsation, etc. 
Now that physicians can revive the heart after it has stopped 
beating (heart-death) a new definition of death (brain-death) has 
become ne:cessary. 
Clinical death occurs in humans when the heart and lungs stop 
functioning. This deprives the brain of oxygen and, unless 
20Eric Cameron, 11Euthanasia:: Mercy or Murder? 11 , Liberty. 
(November-December, 1975): 5. 
12 
13 
resuscitation begins immediately, brain death follows, because the brain 
cannot survive without oxygen and its tissues do not heal or regenerate 
as other tissues do. The brain dies in stages, beginning with the cerebral 
cortex, then the mid-brain, and lastly, the brain stem. Cellular death 
follows, with organs and tissues remaining alive a bit longer. The in-
terest in brain function has become more refined, but what has provided 
a special urgency requiring immediate attention has been the parallel 
development in highly complex techniques of organ transplantation. Not 
only does it become a matter of concern how long biological life should 
be maintained artificially, if the brain has died, and at what social 
costs, but, more specifically, in order to proceed with organ transplants, 
there must be absolute clarity about when the donor is to be considered 
legally dead. Are some people to be considered more dead than others if 
their organs are needed? If a serious accident destroys a victim's 
brain, but his basic functions are maintained artificially, does he 
ever die? In 1968 an A£ Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to 
Examine the Definition of Brain Death proposed criteria which would 
enable a doctor t o pronounce a patient dead when the traditional signs of 
death-respiratmry and circulatory failure were obscured by the re-






Unreceptivi ty and unres~onsitivity (that is, no response 
even to painful stimuli). 
No muscular movement and no spontaneous breathing for at 
leas.t one hour, or for three minutes if a mechanical 
respirator is turned off. 
No elicitable reflexes, ocular movements, or blinking, 
and the presence of fixed, dilated pupils. 
A flat isoelectric electroencephalogram (EEG). 
6. 
No change when all of these tests are repeated at least 
twenty-four hours later. 
These criteria to be exclusive of two conditions: 
hypothermia (body temperature below 90°F) or central 
nerv~us syste~1depression due to drugs such as barbJ.turates. · 
Medical debate over this new definition of death appears to center 
around the length of time that cessation of brain activity must con-
tinue before death can be certified,since it is possible for brain 
wave activity to resume after it has stopped. The question is especially 
difficult where heart transplants are involved, for the organ must be 
removed as soon as possible after death, and the twenty-four hours 
specified in the Harvard definition may be too long a delay for the 
heart to remain in usuable condition. 
However, the terms 11brain death11 and 11heart death11 still suggest 
an unsettling distinction, since there can be one without the other. 
Cases have even been known where autopsy has later revealed that the 
brain had been liqui~ied while the heart and lungs were still func-
tioning. In some cases where the cerebal cortex has been destroyed, 
the brain stem continues for a time to regulate heart and lung func-
tioning. 
BT. Julius Korein, Professor of Neurology at the New York Uni-
versity School of Medicine, makes a further distinction between brain 
death (death of the entire brain including the brain stem) and cere-
bral death. He concludeS. that when cerebral death has been determined, 
21Henry J. Cadbury, Lorraine K. Cleveland, John C. Cobb, Elizbeth 
Conrad Corkey, Richard L. Day, John w. Elliot, J. Russell, and Joseph 
Stokes, HhQ Shall Live? Man 1s Control~ Birth and Death. (New York: 
Hill and Wang., 1970) p. 111. 
14 
the physician should pronounce the patient cerebrally dead and suggest 
the discontinuation of cardiovascular and pulmonary support systems. 
In other words, cerebral death is death. It is his opinion that advance 
in medicine has accelerated development of techniques that will allow 
the physician to define and diagnose cerebral deatK with accuracy 
and rapidity in an appropriate hospital setting. If this is true, the 
concept of cerebral death may be the best that can be done b,y way of 
updating the detection of death. 
The rapidity with which cerebral death can be determined will 
help to solve the problem of potential organs available for transplant 
being damaged beyond use by asphyxia. The speed with which cerebral 
15 
death can be determined will allow organs to be removed more prompt?_l.y.:.:·f;c.Qlll 
a donor. Dr. Henry Beecher calculates that this would make available 
in the U. S. each year over 10,600 kidneys for approximately 7,600 needy 
kidney recipients and 6,000 livers for 4,000 potential liver recipients. 
The speed and accuracy with which death can be determined is of 
importance also to the issue of euthanasia. For those cases where 
cerebral death can be determined to have occurred, the turning off of 
machines maintaining the vital signs need not be considered euthanasia. 
Other problems have been created by our advanced medical technology. 
One of these is the high cost of medical care. There have been medical 
cases reported in which patients with irreversible drain damage have 
been maintained for up to eight years with tubes for feeding and release 
of bodily wastes. The patients were maintained in a state of absolutely 
no mental response. Expenses reached incredibly high proportions. Had 
the tube been taken away, many such patients would have died completely 
within seventy-two hours. 
A final consideration that the advent of medical technology has 
brought upon us is the problem of allocation of medical resources. If 
diseases of the heart and cancer are brought under substansive control 
and the process of aging could be manipulated, almost all death would 
16 
be accidental or intentional. Given the track record of medica1 science, 
it is not hard to believe that cancer and heart disease may some day be 
curable. Current research in aging also seems very promising. 
These advances are also going to place a strain on the population 
that one day might make it quite necessary to lay down a basis for 
allocation of economic resources as between those of advanced age, those 
who are younger, and those who are defective. Sociologists are pre-
dicting that today 1s "Y9uth culture" will have disappeared by the year 
2000, when the Western wor~ will be dominated by the middle-aged, and 
pensioners will outnumber teen-agers. The trend toward an aging popula~ 
tion is already under way in the industrialized countries of the West, 
the Communist world and Japan. One cause is decreasing birth rates. 
Another is that science has been increasing life expectancy with new 
drugs that prevent the elderly from suocombing to once-fatal and common 
diseases such as pneumonia. The result is that we now have a medical 
crisis because hospitals are unable to cope with all the chronically 
ill old people suffering from cancer, heart trouble, strokes, etc.22 
22Eric Cameron, "Euthanasia: Mercy or Murder?", p.3. 
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Somewhere along the line a decision will have to be made as to who 
gets the bed, the machine, the blood, and/or the care that cannot be 
afforded everyone. Currently patients who would be candidates for eu-
thanasia are using these resources, which in many cases could be much 
more valuable used elsewhere. 
Psycho] ogj cal perspectjyes_ 
The predicted psychological effect euthanasia would have on 
patients and their families has been used as an argument against its 
enactment. 
It is thought by some that if euthanasia were practiced, some 
persons, especially those who are elderly, would be afraid to enter the 
hospital when in need of help. If they were admitted and given medical 
treatment under such circumstances, the psychological effect might be 
the retardation of their recovery, even when no physical reason exists to 
impede their improvement.23 However, this argument is valid only in 
cases of mandatory euthanasia and would not apply to voluntary euthan-
asia. 
The psychological effect on a dying patient's family is tremendous. 
For them there are long, torturing waits in depersonalized hospital 
settings, heavy expenses to be met for medical treatment, grief for 
their dying loved-one to be coped with and feelings of guilt that must 
be allievated. 24 The question is, can they under such circumstances make 
ZJRobert S. Mo1>:rd.e:op, 11Dying, 11 Scientific American (September, 1973): 
57. 
24For a very good discussion of the psychologicaa trauma . of the 
dying patient and his family and how to deal with it, see Elizabmth 
Kubler-Ross 1 book, .Qu Death and ~. 
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a rational decision regarding euthanasia when the patient cannot make his 
own wishes known? It is certain they cannot make the decision alone. 
The physician must be relied upon to give his medical opinion as to the 
patient's chances and to make the implications of the various alterna-
tives open to the family as clear as possible. 
Still the decision is not an easy one, and many conclude that such 
a decision would be psychologically unbearable. Since each person makes 
decisions within his own, unique psychological perspectives, there 
would seem to be a self-limiting factor on the problems he would en-
counter (i.e. those who would be unable to bear the psychological 
burden would not opt for euthanasia). 
Nevertheless, after the decision has been made, the questions may 
still arise. The family may wonder if their decision was really based 
on the patient's well-being or on their own concerns. 
Le~al Perspectjyes 
The need for an accurate and speedy determination of death has 
already been considered. Although most physicians believe that the 
determination of death is a matter for legal decision and not codifica-
tion by law, that codification would be necessary in order to protect 
doctors from legal proceedings. It would also be necessary in order to 
determine when cases of stopping medical treatment fall under the 
category of euthanasia. 
Arguments against the legalization of euthanasia itself are based 
on the predicted psychological effect discussed in the previous section 
and on the grounds that euthanasia is morally wrong, which is the subject 
of the next section. 
There is, however, an argument for the legalization of euthanasia 
that is set apart from the issue itself. Legalization of euthanasia 
need not necessarily carry with it a commendation of the practice. 
"Indeed, it is among other things, precisely the helpless 
surrender to medical technology and management which the eu-
thanasia movement attempts to counteract with its "living will" 
and its deliberate confrontation with irreversible illness. 
Advocates of euthanasia do not always in fact urge it as public 
policy, but merely as a possible private alternative which should 
be removed from the criminal category ••• Still, there is quite a 
large leap from legally permitting some people to request that 
their own lives not be unnecessarily prolonged by artificial 
means to a public policy requiring all lives to be terminated 
according to certain external criteria. Actually, euthanasia, 
like abortion and contraception, might become a private matter 
between the patient and his doctor. Large numbers of our citizens 
might continue to think euthanasia a sin, as they might contra-
ception and abortion, but they could no longer insist it was 
a crime as well.25 
There are at present bills for the legalization of euthanasia being 
considered in many states, and some have been passed. In Arkansas, a 
patient now has the legal right to refuse medical procedures to extend 
his life by signing a document similar to a will. If the patient can-
not choose, the decision can be made by parents, spouse, children 18 and 
older, or any other nearest living relative. Two doctors must sign a 
statement saying extraordinary means are necessary to prolong the 
patient's life. The attending physician is not liable for complying or 
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refusing to comply with the request. 
Moral Perspectives 
19 
The French physician J. Hamburg has coined the dilema significantly 
in the following quote: 
Science has made us god before we are even worthy of 
being man. 
25sonya Rudikoff, 11The Problem of Euthanasia, 11 Commentary (February, 
1974) :66. 
26This bill is HB 826 Act 879 sponsored by Henry Wilkins of Pine 
Bluff and passed in March, 1977. 
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Sentiment such as this seems to find expression among a great many. 
Those who take the strongest stand against euthanasia often use as 
the basis for their argument the llabsolute 11 priniple of the unconditional 
inviolability of innocent human life. Man seems to have a tendency to 
consider the physical and biological to be ethically normative and 
inviolable. 
This is the basis of the official Roman Catholic opinion held in 
regard to euthanasia. It is stated, however, in the form of the tenth 
commandment--THOU SHALT NOT KILL. In 1957, Pope Pius XII gave a remark-
able address on the prolongation of life in which he referred to some 
hopeless patients, whose soul may have left their body, by the ambiguous 
but interesting term "virtually dead", and added that only ordinary means 
need be used to perserve life. So perhaps the Roman Catholic view is not 
so "unconditional" after all.27 
Maguire suggests that it is not so simple. This absolute principle 
cannot simply be asserted as self-evident. The users of the principle 
must bear the burden of proof, and the proof must come from whatever 
moral meaning is to be found; that is, it must come from a knowledge of 
the morally significant empirical data, the consequences, the existent 
alternatives, the unique circumstances of person, place and time, etc. 
11To say that something· is morally right . ·or wrong in all possible cir-
cumstances implies a divine knowledge of all possible circumstances 
and their moral meaning .u28 
27For a general view of the Roman Catholic position see Appendix, 
Item 7, interview with a Catholic priest in Arkadelphia, Arkansas. 
28Maguire, "Freedom to Die, 11 p. 194. 
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Attempts have been made to base this principle on the predicted 
consequences which would result should the principle be violated. This 
is the cracked dike argument, a kind of ethical domino theory which 
says that if X is allowed., then Y and Z and everything else will be 
allowed. The deficiency in this themry is that it ignores the real 
meaning of the real differences between X, Y, and z. It is, .:.t'urther ... . 
more, fallacious to say that if an exception is allowed, it will be 
difficult to draw the line and therefore, no exception should be allowed. 
Another expe9ted consequence that violation of this principle would 
bring is a resultant lack of t~e awe for human life. This is assuming 
that anything which falls under our control and is subject to our own 
understanding is less deserving of awe. To the contrary, it might be 
our involvement through the decision-making process, the use of our 
own capabilities and responsible freedom, which would make us realize 
more the awesomeness of real human life. 
Harmon Smith says that Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Karl Barth are 
representative of those Protestant theologians who hold that it is for 
God alone to make an end to hunan life and that any direct action taken 
against the lives of the sick or incurably infirm is tantamount to 
murder. 
Bonhoeffer considers the question in his work, Ethics, of whether 
it is permissable to destroy painlessly an innocent life which is no 
longer worth living. Bonhoeffer's answer is that "the question regarding 
euthanasia must be answered in the negative. 1129 The two assumptions 
. ./ 
29Dietriech, Bonhoeffer, Ethics. Edited by Bethge Eberhard. (New 
York: MacMillian Press, 1965) p. 121. 
Bonhoeffer ' eperates from are (1) that God alone has power over life and 
death and (2) all and any life is worth living. Smith also points out 
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that Bonhoeffer doubtless knew of the systematic extermination of certain 
classes of peoples in Germany in the 1930's and 1940's, and this may 
largely account for the absolutely uncompromising position which he took 
regarding euthanasia. Yet Bonhoeffer was not so uncompromising as some 
betray him to be for he also says in Ethics that, 11 If a sufferer from 
incurable disease cannot fail to see that his care must bring about the 
material and psychological ruin of his family, and if he, therefore, by 
his own decision frees them from this burden, then no doubt there are 
many objections to such unauthorized action; and yet here too a con-
demnation will be impossible."JO 
Karl Barth treats the subject of abortion in his Church Dogmatics 
and makes an exception in his condemnation of it only when two lives, 
that of the mother and the child, are in conflict. Concerning euthan-
asia, however, Barth says another life is not in competition with that of 
the patient and, therefore, he maintains that there is no alternative 
but to respect life by preserving it. He feels euthanasia can be re-
garded only as murder, i.e., as a wicked usurpation of Dod's sovereign 
right over life and death. Barth admits that "tempting questions" are 
raised but says, "The central insight in this whole complex of problems 
is that it is for God and God alone to make an end of human life, and 
JOJohn D. Bennet, "The Van Dusens' Suicide Pact," Christianity and 
Crisis. (March 31, 1975): 68. 
that man should help in this only when he has a specific and clear com~ 
mand from God11 3i Barth leaves open the possibility of such a command. 
What the question really seems to come down to, though, is what 
constitutes real human life? The termonology 11quality of life" as 
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opposed to "quantity of life" is used quite often. Although these phrases 
have a certain emotive appeal, they have no clear-cut definitions. The 
quality of life is what would be considered 11real 11 human life, while 
quantity of life is continued through biological vitality. Is merely 
physical vegetative life sacred, or is it life that is actually or po-
tentially personal that is sacred? In fact, should biological vitality 
even be considered life. MUch discussion revolves around the question 
of when man is dead; perhaps it should be asked when does man stop 
living? Should our aim be to preserve life at all costs? To answer 
these questions we must consider what constitutes life, when saving 
of life really becomes a torturing of it, and if man can legitimately 
exercise any control over the manner and time of his death. 
Life and death have traditionally been considered only from a 
biological standpoint in cases of euthanasia because it is in these 
terms that life and death can be more easily measured. Life and 
death in this sense are directly opposing one another--life being the 
"summon bonum" and death a thing to be fought at all costs. I Corinthians 
15:26 depicts death as the last enemy left to conquer. Is it fair to S<J.y, 
however, that the death meant here is biological death? There are 
biblical passages which are used to support biological vitality as the 
31Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics. (Illinois: Allenson, 1936) p. 210. 
criterion of life. Two such ones are Deuteronomy 12:23 and Leviticus 
17:14 which intertwine life and blood so closely that is seems they can-
not be separated. Pliny shows in Natural History how the two were so 
closely equated that epileptics would quaff the warm blood of a freshly 
killed gladiator to alleviate their condition. 
Harmon Smith sa~, 
11Blood is preconditional to life, but man does not live 
by blood· alonel More to the point, if what we conventionally 
mean by human life is no more than biological vitality, I 
would argue that man does not live by life alone. It is no 
abuse of the gospel to paraphrase Jesus in this way; and neither 
is it inconsistent with his proclamation that a man's life 
does not consist in his posessions, that we require more than 
bread for life, and that the "abundant life" does not denigrate 
but nevertheless transcends mere physical existence.n32 
Itwould be difficult on the basis of biblical evidence to simply 
affirm the lowest, common natural denominator, namely vitality, as life. 
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The biological aspects need not be diminished, but neither should they be 
made solely determinative of human life and death. To differientate 
human life and death from that of plant and animal we must give it some 
significance not common to the rest. 
Even when we should be able to satisfactorily determine what con-
stitutes life there comes the question of when in our treatment of a 
patient are we prolonging life and when we are prolonging death. Relief 
of suffer~ng and prolongation of life are not necessarily complementary 
and often come into conflict. Joseph Fletcher regards the issue of eu-
thanasia not as one of life or death, but as one of which kind of death, 
an agonized or a peaceful one. 
32Harmon L. Smith, Ethics and the New Medicine. (Nashville: 
Abingdon Press, 1970) p. 125. 
Harmon Smith points out that the Hippocratic Oath does not say that 
life is the "summon bonum", but that the patient's well-being is. These 
are often not the same thing. Can we say that doctors who will not let 
hopelessly ill patients die are aggressors against the well-being of the 
patients, the patient's family, and all their resources so long as the 
patient's death is artificially postponed? 
We are still faced with the question of whether or not man can 
legitimately exercise a control over the manner and time of his death. 
Most agree that there is a fitting time to die, but will not say when 
that time is unless in retrospect. In other words, people are willing 
only to look back and say that it was his time to die. 
Christians have typically held the belief that life is a gift from 
God and therefore ultimately his. Moreover, belief in the sovereignty 
of God has caused Christians to ascribe the entire spectrum of events, 
from life to death, to God's causative will. All of the good as well as 
the bad, including the contrdictions inderent in each, have been inter-
preted with a cause-and-effect correlation between God's will and human 
events. This reasoning equates what is "natural" with God's will. 
Joseph Fletcher says, "We are not as persons of moral stature to be 
ruled by ruthless and unreasoning physiology but rather by reason and 
self-control." He maintains that the supreme value of life is person-
ality and that we should in no way subordinate ourselves to natural law. 
He adds that our "customary morality" destroys human freedom and dis-
torts human knowledge and thereby deprives man of the capacity to be a 
man.33 
JJibid., p. 163. 
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Fletcher uses these concepts of 11 customary morality11 and human free-
dom in his discussions concermng active and 'passive euthanasia. He<sig'ni-
fies "act" as personal and professional interference with natural processes. 
Correspondingly 11 omission11 is the ahdication of further personal and pro-
fessional responsibility to a vague kind of naturalistic determinism. 
We have again arrived back to submission to natural processes and this 
approach has long been the modus operandi of Western law and medicine, 
and often theology as well. The question is whether it should continue 
to be so. 
I would again refer you to the case of Missy.34 In consider&ng 
her case, compare the desirability of death by active means as opposed 
to passive means. 11Though omission and commission are different 
realities with a potential for different moral meaning, they have a · .;. _, , 
suggestive similarity in that in both cases, someone is dead who 
would have been alive it a different decision had been made. 1135 
F±~t~he~ maintains that the goal, motive and foreseeable conse-
quences in both forms, the direct and indirect voluntary courses of 
action, are the same: i.e., the death of the patient. "Because of these 
common ethical factors, I am personally unable to see any real ethical 
difference betwe·en' ;the~ ·"fl.li9, but there are other moral theologians who 
profess to find a difference, because the means employed are different. 1136 
34see Appendix, Item 1. 
35Maguire, Death ~ Choice, p. 13. 
36Joseph Fletcher, 11Anti-Dysthanasia: The Problem of Prolonging . 
Death, 11 p. 78. 
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He sees the difference between doing nothing to keep a patient alive and 
giving a fatal dose of a pain-killing or other lethal drug as being a 
very cloudy one, because in both cases the decision is "morally de-
liberate." 
Paul Ramsey says that, of course, the intention is the same either 
way--meaning the end in view. But he disagrees with Fletcher's assertion 
that the means employed in both instances have the same moral meaning. 
He sees no problem with the ethical validity of willing the end for euen 
in the strictest religious ethics, "the desire for death can be licit. 1137 
He still, however, sees great moral difference in how that end : is 
accomplished. 
Fletcher makes the statement in the course of his argument that, 
11as Kant said, if we will the end, we will the means. 11 3B This is a 
statement from Kant's analysis of hypothetical imperatives, .. which are 
dependent on consequences. Ramsey answers in this way: 
One could argue that if. one wills the end he wills the 
means--but not, just any o1ntmeans ••• One could say that there 
are different means--and differences between action and omissions 
that make room for properly aaring actions--that may let the 
patient have the death he not ~mproperly or even quite rightly 
desireso While it might be argued that the Kantian maxim 
applies to means necessary to secure a desired and desirable 
end, still where there are more than one means to this same 
end, to will that end leaves open the choice among means. A 
means may be right, another wrong, to the same end.39 
37Gerald Kelly, 11The Duty of Using Artificial Means of Preserving 
Life," Theological Studies 11 (June, 1950): 217. 
38Joseph Fletcher, "The Patient's Right to Die, 11 Harper's (October, 
1960): 143. 
39Paul Ramsey, The Patient S2 Person. (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1970) p. 153. 
v. Conclusion 
It is obvious by now that euthanasia has been spoken to by a 
variety of persons--physicians, nurses, theologians, philosophers, poli-
ticians, scientists, population experts, lawyers, psychologists, the 
aged, the sick--in a variety of ways on many different levels. Daniel 
40 Maguire suggests our nation's priori ties are out. of place, and Harmon 
Smith says, 11 It is important that all the variables in the mix be self-
consciously sorted out, assessed, and assigned a place of relative 
priority according to their respective bearing on the decision-making 
moment. 1141 
This, to me, seems to be our job. We must sort out the arguments 
concerning euthana§ia which are invalid or irrelevant and consider these 
which are relevant and valid. In this light, several observations can 
be made: 
(1) It is easy to confuse arguments for the necessity of 
euthanasia, such as those concerning our limited medical 
resources and the need for organs for transplanting and for 
the 11moral validity 11 of euthanasia, 
(2) Medical knowledge and technology are invaluable in 
accurately determining death, and assessing extra-
ordinary means and patient conditions. These con-
siderations, however, deal with the classification 
of patients and the implementation~ of _euthanasia--
not with the rightness or wrongness of the act. 
(3) The psychological consequences of euthanasia do bear 
on its validity. However, for the reasons that have 
already been considered, I believe the evidence to be 
40Maguire, 11Freedom to Die, 11 p. 194. 
41
smith, ~cit., p. 156, 
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to the contrary that the psychological risk involved 
is too great. Risk always exists when man has the 
freedom of choice. Careful regulation can minimize 
that risk, and there are appropriate and effective 
means of dealing with that risk when it is realized. 
(4) Neither can the state of the law be used as argument 
for or against euthanasia, because the law does not 
determine rightness or wrongness. Legislation re-
flects what we decide to be right on moral grounds. 
At least this is how it should be in the ideal sit-
uation. Our job, then, includes working for the 
legislation that would be the normal outcome of our 
conclusion regarding euthanasia. 
We are left now with the moral deliberations concerning euthanasia. 
I think we can draw some logical conclusions from the evidence that has 
been presented in this paper. First of all, prolongation of life should 
not be in all cases our supreme goal. It is very hard to determine when 
prolongation of life ends and prolongation of death begins. Secondly, 
it is not so important that we determine the point between the two, when 
we regard the patient's well-being as our greatest concern. In some 
cases, the patient's well~being will even be in direct conflict with 
prolongation of life, especially when that life is considered the mere 
biological vitality common to all organisms. When a person has lost 
those characteristics which make him a person and distinguish his life 
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from that of other animals and vegetables, then his demise is justifiable 
on the same grounds used to justify, say for example, the demise of an 
injured and suffering horse. If we then can concede that we do have the 
right to exercise control over ourselves, we neeanot yield ourselves 
to natuv.al process. (In actuality, we interfer with natural process all 
the time eonsidering that medical treatment of any kind changes or re-
verses the process.) Therefore, I would conclude that euthanasia is a 
morally valid end. 
We still must decide on the issue of active euthanasia. Gerald 
Ke·lly has said and has been verified by virtually everyone, that the 
desire for death is licit. Kant has said as we will the means ,-.·::Wer· 
will tne end. Since we have said that we need not yield ourselves to 
natural processes, why not active euthanasia? Ramsey's point is that 
when there are other than 11 active 11 means available, these other means 
are to be preferred since his concern is the best care for the dying 
patient. I would agree with him that in most cases active euthanasia 
would be "unnecessary" and even 11unpreferable" , but perhaps not immoral. 
But I also suspect on the basis of Ramsey's admition that it might be 
argued that the Kantian maxim does apply to means "necessary" to secure 
the desired end, that in cases where active euthanasia is necessary to " 
secure the desired end, the patient's well-being, that even he would 
agree to its implementation. Therefore, I would also conclude that 
active means, when they are most in line with the patient's well-being, 
are morally valid means to the morally valid end. 
In closing, I would say that the conclusions I have drawn, while 
I think them to be legitimate, are nevertheless, just ~ conclusions. 
Each person must draw his own conclusions. Joseph Fletcher sums~it up 
like this: 
••• man's moral stature, his quality as a moral being, de-
pends first upon his possession of freedom of choice and, 
second, upon his knowledge of the courses of action open 
to his choice. In a very real sense it is possible to re-
gard freedom and knowledge as different sides of one pre-
requisite to ethical living, namely control of self and 
circumstances. 2 
42 Joseph Fletcher, Morals and Medicine. (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1954) p. 100. 
}0 
Thus, to put it in Fletcher's terms, once we have given an individual 
the knowledge of the courses of action open to his choice, we must give 
him the freedom to make that choice in order for him to live ethically. 
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APPENDIX 
Item 1--The Case of Missy 
Dr. Warren Reich, a senior research associate at the Kennedy Cen-
ter for Bioethics at Georgetown University, posed a difficult case at the 
meeting of the International Congress of Learned Societies in the Field 
of Religion in September, 1972. The case involved a girl (Missy) who was 
born with spina bifida with meningo~elocele of the lumbar spine. Spina 
bifida refers to an opening in the spine and meningomyelocele is a con-
dition in which portions of the spinal cord, as well as meninges and 
spinal fluid, have slipped out through the spinal opening and are en-
closed in a sac. The child lacked reflex activity in both legs and 
could not control her anal or urinary sphincters. She had club feet. 
Hydrocephalus, "water on the brain 11 , develops in 90% of these cases. 
To treat that, a 11shunt 11 has to be surgically inserted to drain the 
cerebrospinal fluid from the brain into the heart or peritoneum. Even 
with a shunt, the child would have a 50:50 chance of being mentally re-
tarded. Missy's complications might eventually require a surgical pro-
cedure which would allow her urine to drain into a bag which she would 
wear on her abdomen permanently. Bowel control would be a lifelong pro~ 
blem for her. Kidney failure is a constant danger and the most common 
cause of death for children with this affliction. Broken bones and 
burns are the frequent lot of such children also, due to problems in 
mobility and sensation. 
In the panel dicussion of this case, Dr. Harmon Smith of Duke 
University Divinity School noted that until ten years ago, about 80% of 
such babies died. t c'J:oday, 75% survive. Thus, again, medical advance 
brings on troubling new moral questions. Should this baby have been 
allowed to die from the meningities that would normally ensue in such 
cases? Or should the medics have begun at once what would be for the 
child a lifetime of extraordinary care? The panel at the congress (which 
along with Reich and Smith, included Dr. Eric Cassell of Cornell Uni-
versity Medical College) considered only these two options. 
In the discussion, it was suggested to the panel that there were 
options, such as the direct termination of life. This was an option 
that no member of the pa!lel would even consider. 11 I find it is 
absolutely incredible, even in a mere debate, to consider this a serious 
alternative in a group of moralists and theologians, 11 said Professor 
Smith. The other panelists agreed that this line should never be crossed. 
A very fair question of course is why? Why is it so clear that these 
two alternatives exhaust the moral possibilities of the described case 
and that the path of direct termination is beyond the pale? 
First of all, it is not clear that meningitis would be an efficient 
11friend 11 • As Dr. Reich pointed out, babies have been known to survive 
the meningitis and live a number of years without being aware of anything 
and requiring a great amount of physical care. Thus the problem could 
be intensified by mere omission and reliance on the disease to achieve 
the desired results. Furthermore, as one of the doctors in the audience 
pointed out in this discussion, death by meningitis in such cases is not 
normally serene. It is not really a neat solution. Disease in this 
instance may not come to the aid of ethics. 
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There can be good reasons offered to keep a child like this alive. 
Advances are being made in the treatment of nearly all the symptoms of 
this affliction. It may even be argued that if people do not take a 
chance on life for such children, medicine will not be able to learn 
all that it needs to conquer and prevent this disorder. It may be fur-
ther argued that we should be extremely cautious about opting for death 
for a hhild. Caution is further indicated b,y the basic fact that a 
decision is being made for another person. 
Given the realities of the case as described, however, it is 
possible that death might be seen as preferable to the kind of life 
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this child could have. The moral question then is whether it could be 
brought on by the administration of drugs or whether a compromise could 
be found whereby the drugs are used to comfort and to weaken in co-
ordinatination with the meni~tis. In the present state of legal and 
moral debate, the latter possibility would offer the advantage of pro-
tective ambiguity. There is no precise way ~f knowing whether a drug is 
accelerating death as it relieves discomfort since the unrelived dis-
comfort might accelerate death too and since the degree of immunity to 
the drug is a variable. Still, this flight to ambiguity,would re-
present a retreat from the question to be explored--Can it be moral and 
should it be legal to take direct action to terminate life in certain 
circumstances. 
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Item 2--The Hippocratic Oath 
I swear b.Y Apollo the physician and Aesculapius and health and all-
heal and all the gods and goddesses that according to my ability and 
judgment I will keep this oath and this stipulation--to reckon him who 
taught me this art equally dear to me as my parents, to share my substance 
with him and relieve his necessities if required, to look upon his off-
spring in the same footing as my own brothers and to teach them this art 
if they shall wish to learn it without fee or stipulation and that b.Y 
precept, lecture, and every other mode of instruction I will impart a 
knowledge of the art to my own sons and those of my teachers and to 
disciples bound b.Y a stipulation and oath according to the law of 
medicine but to none others. I will follow that system of regimen which, 
according to my ability and judgment, I consider for the benefit of my 
patients, and abstain from whatever is deleterious and mischievous. I 
will give no deadly medicine to ~yone if asked nor suggest any such 
counsel, and in like manner I will_not give to a woman a pessary to 
produce abortion. With purity and with holiness I will pass my life and 
practice my art. I will not cut persons laboring under the stone but 
will leave this to be done b.Y men who are practitioners of this work. 
Into whatever houses I enter, I will go into them for the benefit of the 
sick and will abstain from every voluntary act of mischief and cor-
ruption, and further, from the seduction of females or males, of free-
men and slaves. Whatever, in qmnnection with professional practice, or 
not in connection with it, I see or hear, in the life of men, which 
ought not to be spoken of abroad, I will not divulge as reckoning that 
all such should be kept secret. While I continue to keep this oath 
unviolated, may it be granted to me to enjoy life and the practice of the 
art, respected b,y, .all mem at all times, but should I trespass and 
violate this oath, may the reverse be my lot. 
rtem 3--The Hippocratic Oath in Modified Form 
I solemnly pledge myself to consecrate my life to the service of 
humanity. I will give to my teachers the respect and gratitude which is 
their due; I will practice my profession with conscience and dignity; 
the health of my patient will be my first consideration; I will respect 
the secrets with are confided in me; I will maintain by all means in 
my power the honor and the noble traditions of the medical profession; 
my colleagues will be my brothers; I will not permit considerations of 
religion, nationality, race, party politics, or social standing to 
intervene between my duty and my patient; I will maintain the utmost 
respect for human life, from the time of conception; even under threat, 
I will not use my medical knowledge contrary to the laws of humanity. 
I make these promises solemnly, freely and upon my honor. 
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Item 4--Living Will 
TO MY FAMILY, MY PHYSICIAN, MY CLERGYMAN, MY LAWYER--
If the time comes when I can no longer take part in decisions for rolf 
own future, let this statement stand as the testament of my wishes: 
If there is no reasonable expectation of rolf recovery from physical 
or mental disability, 
I, 
request that I be allowed to die and not be kept alive by artificial 
means or heroic measures. Death is as much a reality as birth, growth, 
maturity and old age--it is the one certainty. I do not fear death as 
much as I fear the indignity of deterioration, dependence and hopeless 
pain. I ask that medication be mercifully administered to me for 
terminal suffering even if it hastens the moment of death. 
)6 
This request is made after careful consideration. Although this 
document is not legally binding, you who care for me will, I hope, feml 
morally bound to follow its mandate. I recognize that it places a 
heavy burden of responsibility upon you, and it is with the intention of 
sharing that responsibility and of mitgating any feelings of guilt that 
this statement is made. 
Signed --------------------------
Date -----------------------Witnessed by 
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Item 5--Survey Conducted by Michelle Wasson 
1. Which best defines your concept of human life? 
A. A body that performs the fundamental processes through artificial 
means and the brain is virtually 11dead11 and no thinking or lea.rl.'i-
ing or communicating takes place. 
b. A body that performs the fundamental processes on its own, but 
the brain is virtually "dead" and no thinking or learning takes 
place. 
c. A body that can perform its fundamental processes on its own, 
can participate normally in day to day activities and has some 
degree of intelligence and comprehension. 
2. A patient with incurable cancer is slowly dying but because of a good 
heart he may live several weeks. He has developed a toleration to 
the medicine that eases the pain. A doctor cuts off his intravenous 
feedigg and the patient died in several hours. Do you agree with 
what the doctor did? 
a. Agree b. Dasagree 
). Do you believe in "mercy killing?" 
a. Yes b. No 
4. The parents of a mongoloid baby (severe mental retardation) re-
quiring surgery for survival refused to give permission. It took 
the baby 15 days to die. 
a. Should the parents have been made to take the child home and 
bear the pain of standing the death watch? 
b. Should the state have taken legal charge of the baby from the 
parents and then authorized the pperation? 
c. Should a court order have overruled the parents' decision? 
d. Should a speeding up of death have taken place such as increasing 
the dosage of medicine been added to the lack of an operation? 
5. Do you believe in ••• 
a. indirect euthanasia (mercy killing)--such as not using any 
artificial means to keep someone alive and letting nature take 
her course? 
b. direct euthanasia--doing something to speed up the dying process? 
c. both 
6. A diabetic patient who has been using insulin for years and who 
deirelO.ps ani':hn~pe:.dit~l:e. ·" and very painful kind of cancer can continue 
to use insulin and may live many months in agony. By discontinuing 
the insulin the patient would lapse into a coma and die painlessly. 
If you were the doctor would you continue or discontinue the insulin? 
a. Continue b. Discontinue 
?. Would you believe in g~v~ng an overdose of medicine so a patient would 
die quickly rather than slowly dying for days or weeks in pain? 
a. Yes b. No 
Item 5--Continued 
8. Do you think the parents of a Mongoloid child should place it in an 
institution where it would be with children of the same condition 
or take care of it at home where the parents could take care of it 
even if there were other children in the family? 
a. at an institution b. at home 
9. Would you believe in the 11mercy killing 11 of a baby who has severe 
brain damage? 
a. Yes b. No 
10. Would you shoulder the responsibility of caring for a child who is 
accutely deformed, or unable to progress beyond the mentallity of a 
totally dependant infant? 
a. Yes b. No 
11. A preacher's son was born physically frail and severely brain-
damaged because its oxygen was shut. of!. in' the womb. The doctor 
says the child will be close to an inanimace object. The doctor 
suggested action--taking away of oxygen--that implied if the baby 
could not survive on his own, h'e should not live at all. The 
father agreed. How do you feel about his decision? 
a. Strongly against d. Moderately for 
b. Moderately against e. Strongly for 
c. Indifferent or neutral 
12. What is your opinion of mercy killing? 
a. It is o.k. to do it indirectly--not using artificial means to 
keep a person alive. 
b. It is o.k. to do it directly by giving an overdose, etc. 
c. Both a and b. 
d. It is murder. 
13. If you were in an accident that caused severe brain damage which 
made you totally dependant on others and your bodily functions had 
to be carried on by artificial means would you look with favor on 
someone relieving you of your life? 
a. Yes b. No c. Undecided 
14. If you were in an accident and your life was totally dependent on 
a machine and another person needed one of your organs to survive 
would you choose 
a. to stay alive with the help of the machine(s). 





Item 6--Results of the Survey 
OVERALL RESULTS OF SURVEY 
1. a-2.27% b-21.27% c-95.45% 
2. a-45.45% ~54.54% 
3. a-59.05% b-34.09% ?-6.8% 
4. a-13.6% b-27.27% c-11.3% d-27.27% e-20.43% 
5. a-59.09% b-11.36% c-28.45% 1-9.09% 
6. a-50.0% b-47.72% ?-2.27<%> 
7. a-29.54% b-70.45% 
8. a-78.18% b-22.72% 
9. a-34.09% b-61.36% ?-4.54% 
10. a-59.09% b-34.09% ?~6.818% 
11. a-4.54% b-13.6% c-13.6% d-59.09% e-6.818% 
12. a-59.09% b-2.27% c-18.18% d-18.18% ?-4.54% 
13. a-45.45% b-13.6% c-40.9% 
14. a-11.36% b-40.9% c-47.72% 
Jtem ?--Interview with Father Cooper of St. Mary's Catholic Church in 
Arkadell?hia. Arkansas 
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Father Cooper said that the Roman Catholics were, of course, 
against what is commonly called mercy killing simply because it is the 
taking of a life, and no one has the right to take a life for any reason 
except God. It's like abortion in that we consider it murder. I think 
our ideas are based on logic. The reasoning is there that the enS 
might be good in cases of euthanasia, such as ones where a poor guy is a 
vegstable or something like that. But the means to accomplish this end 
would be bad and therefore would make the whole act bad. You can't use 
evil means to accomplish a good end. OUr contention is that only God 
gave life and only God can take life. When we start saying who can 
live, we 1re like Hitler. Eet 1s face it, soon it would be unproductive 
people or people who couldn't meet up to certain standards that would be 
put to death like they were in Hitler's concentration camps. As I said 
our basic contention is that euthanasia is murder because no one has the 
right to take life except God. 
Now that could bring up the question of capital punishment and why 
the Catholics haven't taken such a strong stand on it as they have things 
like abortion. Well, we don't approve of it in a sense, but we uphold the 
right of the state to put someone to death who has committed a serious 
crime. We uphold the right of the state according to the will of the 
people. We're neither for or against it so to speak. In other words, it 
is just up to the people. If they want capital punishment, okay. And if 
they do we at least say the state does have a right to put someone to 
death who has committed a serious crime such as the taking of a life. 
However, I don 1t think the same thing holds for euthanasia for it is :!·· ·. 
different from capital punishment. And when you think about it, God 
may have some purpose for the life that is inflicted with disease and 
retardation. I think a good Christian person can see good in every-
thing and such a person could be a blessing in disguise. Basically, 
that's our stand. 
There are a lot of practical considerations such as the great 
expense involved in a long hospital stay. We are not morally obJigated 
to keep a person alive by- cxtr.a"Or·tjj:J.1ary · :r.1eans. -: I' thi;ok we have to ta:ke 
a neutral ground here. We can't say what is right or wrong in these 
cases, but I do not think this is so much mercy killing as just letting 
nature take its course. Personally, when I die I want to aie by natural 
means, but I don't want to be kept alive by artificial means. But we 
have to be careful when we talk about extraordinary means because 
certainly a little bit of glucose would be far from extraordinary 
means. 
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